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FOREWORD
The United States has vital security and economic interests
in Northeast Asia, one of the most dynamic regions of the world.
This monograph focuses on the three bilateral relationships,
those connecting China, Japan, and the United States to each
other, which will dominate the future of the region.
Dr. Thomas Wilborn analyzes these relations, taking into
account key issues involving Taiwan and North Korea, and offers
insights regarding their future course. He also reviews U.S.
engagement policy and assesses the value of U.S. military
presence for regional stability.
Dr. Wilborn suggests that in the short range, Washington
should avoid significant changes of policy. However, in the long
range, the United States will have to establish machinery which
provides ways for the major states, especially China and Japan,
to assert greater initiative commensurate with their economic
power, yet within a stable political context. Multilateral
operational structures to supplement existing bilateral relations
in Northeast Asia may provide a means for the United States to
influence long-range trends and protect U.S. interests.
Long-term readers of these monographs are well familiar with
the distinctive quality of Tom Wilborn's work. For more than two
decades with the Strategic Studies Institute, the hallmarks of
his analyses have been clarity, thoroughness, and relevance for
the policymaker. This study is his final contribution prior to
retirement from Federal civil service. He leaves us with a rich,
abundant legacy of scholarship. We wish him and his wife, Sally,
great enjoyment of the years ahead.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The major powers of Northeast Asia--those nations which can
demand to be involved in all significant regional decisions--are
China, Japan, and the United States. Russia may be able to claim
that status in the future, but for a number of years Moscow will
not have the political, economic, or military capabilities
required.
The other actors in the region are North and South Korea and
Taiwan. Like Russia, they are not insignificant powers which can
be ignored. Indeed, if there is conflict in the region, it will
probably begin because of actions taken in Taipei or the two
Korean capitals. And the economies of South Korea and Taiwan make
them valuable trading partners for the three major powers of the
Northeast Asia Strategic Triangle.
The three bilateral relationships involving China, Japan,
and the United States are the critical factors of Northeast Asian
regional politics. They all are, and probably will remain into
the 21st century, in flux.
•

•

The U.S.-Japanese relationship is the most stable.
--

Despite serious differences on trade issues, both
nations support the international trading system
and regional stability.

--

The mutual commitment to democracy and market
economics provides an ideological foundation for
the alliance.

--

The U.S.-Japan relationship is the most highly
institutionalized, and the two nations have the
highest degree of interdependence, of the three
bilateral ties.

--

Domestic political changes in either capital would
be the most likely factor to disrupt the alliance.

The Japan-China relationship is potentially volatile in
the long term.
--

Beijing and Tokyo share objectives related to
trade and regional stability, especially in Korea.

--

Long-term interests diverge with respect to
Taiwan, the role of the United States, and Korea.

--

Historic animosities reinforce tensions and
complicate achieving accommodations.
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•

The least stable bilateral relationship of the
Northeast Asian strategic triangle is between China and
the United States.
--

Economic benefits and the desire to avoid conflict
are the strongest, but not necessarily sufficient,
incentives for Beijing and Washington to maintain
the relationship.

--

Differences over Taiwan are the major obstacle to
more comprehensive and beneficial cooperation.

--

Profound ideological differences and perceptions
of national interests will insure that there will
be strains in the relationship for the foreseeable
future.

•

U.S. engagement is a necessary condition for regional
stability.

•

Washington's high priority on economics complicates the
execution of foreign policy.

•

U.S. domination of its bilateral relationships in
Northeast Asia is no longer possible.

•

Abrupt changes of U.S. policy, especially reductions in
forward military presence, would undermine American
security interests in the region.

•

Improved coordination among government agencies,
including military headquarters in the region, and
better recruitment and utilization of regional
specialists, will facilitate smooth execution of policy
in Northeast Asia.

•

For the long range, the United States should place
greater emphasis on the creation of multilateral
structures to supplement U.S. bilateral ties.
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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN NORTHEAST ASIA:
THE CHINA-JAPAN-UNITED STATES STRATEGIC TRIANGLE
INTRODUCTION
Northeast Asia, as every other region of the world, has been
profoundly affected by the end of the Cold War and the implosion
and dissolution of the Soviet Union. While the region's politics
were never entirely subsumed by the bipolar global structure, the
existence of the Soviet Union as putative enemy of China, Japan,
and the United States was the single most important factor
determining regional alignments. Indeed, the two most critical
disputes in the region, the North-South confrontation on the
Korean peninsula and the status of Taiwan, are direct legacies of
the Cold War. With a weak and nonthreatening Russia succeeding
the Soviet Union, other factors--trade, investment, regional
security issues, and historical memories predating the Cold War-now also influence Northeast Asian developments.
Japan and China are clearly the major regional actors in
Northeast Asia--indeed, all of East Asia--and can demand to be
considered on every significant regional decision. This puts them
in a category for which only one other nation, the United States,
can qualify. Yet North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan are not
small, insignificant powers which have no ability to influence
regional events. On the contrary, each of them have capabilities
that permit them to veto certain outcomes, and mobilize support
to achieve other outcomes. Moreover, they are directly involved
in the disputes more likely than any others to drag the regional
major powers into conflict. These governments are relatively
ineffective with respect to other issues, however. China, Japan,
and the United States have the capacity to be engaged in and
influence virtually all regional activities. Russia, the only
extra-regional nation other than the United States that might
play an important role in regional politics, also exerts
influence on some, but relatively few and relatively marginal,
issues.1 Russia's share in the region's economic activity is
minimal, and it does not have the capable regional military force
which its predecessor, the Soviet Union, could deploy in earlier
years. The potential for Moscow to assume a greater role in the
future--most non-Russians believe in a distant future--is the
main source of what influence it can mobilize to affect current
regional security affairs.
There are no Northeast Asian security organizations or
consultation fora--nothing even remotely similar to NATO or CSCE
in Europe. As a result, contemporary inter- national politics in
the region consist primarily of complex patterns of bilateral
relationships among all the actors.2 From the perspective of
regional security, the most critical of these bilateral ties are
those between China and the United States, the United States and
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Japan, and China and Japan. Yet, especially in the short range,
the adversarial relations of Pyongyang and Seoul and of Beijing
and Taipei, as well as the ambivalent ties between Taipei and
Washington and Tokyo, are also extremely important.
The purpose of this monograph is to examine these complex
bilateral relationships in order to develop conclusions
concerning the prospects for stability in the region, and present
recommendations for U.S. policy when appropriate. The analysis is
presented in three sections: overview; regional security
objectives and policies of the major powers (China, Japan, and
the United States), especially in their relations with each
other; and conclusions and implications for the United States.
The more salient aspects of bilateral relations of the other
actors are woven into the descriptions of relations among China,
Japan, and the United States.
OVERVIEW
During the 1970s and early 1980s, at the height of the Cold
War, Northeast Asia reflected the bipolar structure of the global
system, albeit imperfectly. The basic Cold War relationships
among Northeast Asian governments and with the superpowers are
depicted in Figure 1. U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea
were integral links in Washington's containment strategy, and the
United States and China collaborated to frustrate the expansion
of Soviet influence. Moscow's only ally in the region was
Pyongyang, indicating that Moscow's positive political influence
was relatively small even though the perception of the Soviet
Union as the enemy was behind most of these strategic alignments.
While there was no conflict in Northeast Asia, as the Cold War
paradigm suggests, the heavy lines indicating military
confrontation in Figure 1 connect China and the Soviet Union,
Japan and the Soviet Union, the United States and North Korea,
and North and South Korea. Of course, military confrontation
characterized U.S.-Soviet relations as well.
Northeast Asia was heavily armed: the Soviet Far East
contained 53 divisions and some 785 combat aircraft; China, with
some 4 million personnel in the People's Liberation Army (PLA),
deployed 78 divisions and many of its 5,300 combat aircraft
against the Soviets.3 The North Korean military contained some 31
divisions and 38 brigades, as well as approximately 800 combat
aircraft, opposing 21 divisions and 451 combat aircraft of South
Korea.4 Taiwan deployed 21 divisions (army and marine) and eight
separate army brigades, as well as some 400 combat aircraft.5
Japan's military was the least threatening, but nonetheless
contained 13 divisions and 270 combat aircraft.6 The smallest
armed force in the region (one infantry division, one Marine
Expeditionary Force, and 280 combat aircraft) belonged to the
United States.7 However, it had the ability, regularly exercised
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in Korea, to reinforce with decisive force from the United
States. The United States, Soviet Union, and Japan also had
formidable naval capabilities in and around Northeast Asian
waters.
These bipolar patterns were criss-crossed by other
conflicts, allegiances, and historical memories, however. The PRC
and Taiwan, although both anti-Soviet, were locked in seemingly
irreconcilable confrontation over competing visions of China's
future. As reflected by the PRC-DPRK and USSR-DPRK alliances,
Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow shared a commitment to MarxismLeninism, although they were not united in the bipolar
geopolitical struggle. And although not apparent from Figure 1,
intense animosities embedded in still vivid memories of World War
II clouded relations between Chinese and Koreans, on the one
hand, and Japanese, on the other, while deeper historical
memories reinforced distrust of each national group toward all
others.
By the mid 1990s, as illustrated by Figure 2, significant
differences in the relationships in Northeast Asia have evolved.
Russia, principal successor to the Soviet Union, has diplomatic
relations with all governments of the region but Taiwan (and has
even established commercial relations with it), and military
confrontation with none. While former Soviet ballistic missile
submarines are still deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk, the Russian
military, much smaller than the Soviet Far Eastern force before
1989, poses no near-term military threat to its neighbors in East
Asia. Seoul and Beijing have not only established diplomatic
relations, but developed a mutually profitable, rapidly expanding
interchange in trade. And while large military formations still
confront each other across the Taiwan Strait and tensions
sometimes become dangerously high, very important economic
relations and halting (if sometimes caustic and stormy)
"unofficial" political discourse about practical bilateral
relations also now take place. There is still military
confrontation on the Korean peninsula, of course, with even more
forces facing each other than a decade ago.8 A comparison of
Figures 1 and 2 does not indicate much change in U.S. relations
with Northeast Asian governments, but the inauguration of limited
diplomatic and economic contacts with the DPRK is a major
departure from earlier periods, and, in fact, U.S. roles in the
region have significantly changed in a number of ways.
Part of the explanation for the changes in the relations of
Northeast Asian governments is the phenomenal economic dynamism
of the region. While the Cold War was winding down, China, South
Korea, and Taiwan were setting records for economic development.
Their average rates of growth from 1980 to 1992 were 9.1 percent,
9.4 percent, and 10.6 percent, respectively.9 And, like Japan,
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their prosperity--and particularly strong economic growth--highly
depends on foreign trade. Therefore, they all have--more than
before their economic take-offs--a strong incentive to foster
regional stability which allows trade and prosperity to expand.
North Korea is a startling exception, achieving less than 5
percent growth for the entire period, with a shrinking of its
economy in the last several years.10
The lines on Figure 2, like those on Figure 1, only portray
a simplified, formalistic version of regional relationships.
Historical memories still affect the patterns of interaction, and
each broad category of relationships includes significant
variations. Nonetheless, the differences suggested by these two
diagrams, even though they simplify and thus distort reality, are
substantial, and imply an evolving pattern of regional politics
very different from that of the Cold War. The new pattern is
complex, and that complexity itself implies greater
decentralization of authority and therefore fundamentally
different relationships among the actors in the region. Absent
the imperatives of the Cold War, the incentives for Japan to
assert more independent policies seem to be irresistible; the
influence of Russia, now economically destitute, politically
turbulent, and militarily weakened (compared to the military
forces once deployed by the Soviet Union), wanes to only marginal
significance; and U.S. military capabilities, while still
formidable, lose some of their former relevance. And without a
threat from the north, for decades the key factor in China's
security environment, Beijing has established new priorities and
different approaches to its neighbors in the region and, above
all, to the United States.
Compared to the Cold War, the present system is
characterized by great uncertainty and unpredictability. The
United States never actually exercised hegemonic authority in
Northeast Asia, although its influence with Japan and South Korea
was obviously very significant, but there was a degree of
discipline and restraint resulting from the general recognition
of a Soviet threat and determination not to permit Soviet
successes. Without those constraints, and with economic strength
that commands recognition and respect, Northeast Asian elites
appear to more frequently perceive that national interests must
be given priority over interests represented by alliances and
less formal coalitions. They are more likely than formerly to
revive historic grievances, and, at least in the case of China,
pursue them even at the risk of conflict.
NORTHEAST ASIA'S STRATEGIC TRIANGLE
The China Angle.
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Beijing's relations with its neighbors in Northeast Asia, as
well as with the United States and Russia, have probably changed
more than those of any other government in the region; certainly
more than an examination of Figures 1 and 2 might indicate. Deng
Xiaoping's economic reforms and the nation's subsequent economic
growth, the opportunities to expand ties with Moscow presented by
Gorbachev's "new thinking," the massacre at Tiananmen Square, and
the collapse of the Soviet Union, among other things, complicated
relations with some governments and provided stronger ties with
others.
Chinese analysts see both positive and negative elements in
the current international and regional security environments. On
the one hand, they believe that the current security environment
in which foreign policy is executed is, as far as direct military
challenges are concerned, relatively benign. In the 1980s, the
official line in Beijing was that major nuclear war between the
superpowers involving China was inevitable, and serious regional
disputes (e.g., Cambodia, Vietnam, Afghanistan) also threatened
to involve the PRC. Chinese leaders feared a Soviet attack.
Today, in the eyes of Chinese analysts, there is almost no
possibility of major war, and also no regional disputes likely to
result in serious international conflict which would engage
China.11 Certainly they do not believe that conflict is likely
with a Northeast Asian neighbor. The only credible Northeast
Asian scenario of possible violence is with Taiwan, and then only
if its government attempts to formally and legally separate
itself from China or foreign powers intervene in the dispute. In
any case, Beijing considers this an internal, rather than an
international, issue. In other words, the PRC leadership believes
that the current external environment presents fewer overt
challenges to stability than the environment of the early 1980s.
On the other hand, the Chinese are troubled by the dominant
position of the remaining superpower, the United States, and what
they see as a U.S. scheme to impose bourgeois liberal democratic
values on Chinese society through "peaceful evolution" and
through a carefully engineered strategy of containment to prevent
China from assuming its rightful role in the international
system.12
The domestic political environment in which foreign policy
is determined and executed has also changed significantly. Deng
Xiaoping was at the height of his power in the early 1980s. While
there were factional disputes among the elite of the Party, the
political system was stable and Deng dominated virtually all
policy arenas. All significant foreign policy and strategic
initiatives certainly required his approval.13 Now the influence
that the aging Deng, and other surviving members of his
generation, can exercise is limited, and no other individual or
group has emerged which can dominate Chinese politics as he, and
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Mao before him, did. Indeed, it is uncertain who actually
controls what aspects of China's policy, even though Jiang Zemin
is the de jure head of Party, state, and military. Whoever
ultimately succeeds Deng, he/they will represent a new generation
of Chinese leadership which did not lead the Revolution and help
create the socialist state, but matured under socialism and
achieved prominence within Party or state bureaucracies.
At the same time that this struggle for political control
over the central political apparatus is occurring in Beijing,
provincial and local authorities are vying with the national
capital for influence over the allocation of resources and
control of economic activity.14 Decisions made in Beijing are not
necessarily executed in Guangzhou or Shanghai.
The elites making foreign policy, then, are not likely to be
secure in their positions, and less able to sustain decisions
which may be opposed by others in the system. At a time when new
initiatives and approaches may be highly desirable, they will
find it difficult to assume the risks of innovation. In such an
uncertain milieu, it is also likely that contenders for power
will emphasize nationalistic symbols and causes.
Nationalism appears to be the primary ideological force
behind Beijing's foreign policy. Certainly the ideological
pronouncements of Marx, Lenin, Mao, or even Deng no longer affect
decisionmaking, except to provide the generally accepted
analytical framework used to examine and try to understand the
security environment and China's place in it.15 Whereas communism
always divided Chinese intellectuals to some degree, nationalism
is an effective unifying force.
Chinese intellectuals look with great disdain at their
country's confrontation with foreign powers during the "century
of humiliation and shame," when weak Qing and Nationalist
governments were forced to accept unequal treaties,
extraterritoriality, spheres of influence, degra-dation, and
foreign occupation. According to two American-educated Chinese
scholars, the fact of foreign domination and humiliation--and the
determination to rectify the indignity China suffered--is more
important than the notion of a Sinocentric (Middle Kingdom)
perception of the world (highly cultured Chinese v. foreign
barbarians) in understanding Chinese foreign policy. Moreover,
these attitudes are pervasive, affecting both the loyal
government analyst and the dissident expatriate.16 As economic
reform and development become more broadly established, the
importance of these historical experiences may become less
significant, but they are still operative and important now.17
The influence of this historical experience is obvious in
the "informal ideology" or world view which Steven I. Levine
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believes informs most Chinese policymakers and intellectuals. It
contains six propositions:
1. The Chinese are a great people, and China is a great
nation.
2. The Chinese nation deserves a much better fate than that
which it has experienced in the modern world.
3. China should be accorded compensatory treatment from
those powers which have insulted or injured it in the past.
4. As a great nation, China naturally occupies a central
position in world affairs and must be treated as a Great Power.
5. China's national sovereignty must be respected
absolutely, and such respect precludes any foreign criticism of
China's internal politics.
6. China's special virtue in international affairs consists
in the fact that its foreign policy is based not on expediency
but on immutable principles that express universal values such as
justice and equity.18
China's foreign policy expresses these attitudes in
Beijing's obsession with sovereignty. Noninterference in the
internal affairs of other states is a universally recognized
principle of international comity, but it is typically emphasized
most strongly by small powers who fear the intrusion of larger
states. Because Beijing purports to be a major power, and it
consciously seeks to attract foreign investment and expand
foreign trade, both activities which in important ways depend
upon and intensify the high degree of economic and communications
interpenetration in the world today, its extreme emphasis on
sovereignty and attacks on any criticism of Chinese policy as
infringements on sovereignty are unusual. But if Levine's
informal ideology is widely held, this position is at least
under-standable.
Nationalism interacts with the proposition, shared by almost
all governments, that foreign policy should support economic
development and enhance prosperity. For the Chinese elite, whose
actions can no longer be legitimized by a utopian ideology which
has been rejected by all strata of the society, success in
raising the standards of living of the population and expanding
the power of the state is not just a pragmatic objective.
Attaining development goals is necessary to validate the elite's
right to remain in power. According to China's strategy of
development, foreign investment and international trade are
absolutely critical components for success. Unfortunately for
Beijing, an overly broad conception of sovereignty and economic
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development do not always reinforce each other as guides to
policy, forcing decisionmakers to make difficult choices and
causing discontinuities and inconsistencies in China's foreign
policy.
United States. China's most important and most troubling
bilateral relationship is with the United States. In terms of
foreign policy supporting economic growth, U.S. relations have
been critical. The United States was China's second or third
largest trading partner and the largest or third largest market,
depending on whose data is used, in 1994. According to figures
provided by Washington, but not Beijing, more than one-third of
all Chinese exports were purchased by U.S. consumers.19 U.S.
investment as of 1993 was $8.17 billion, which was third largest
but far behind Hong Kong and Taiwan.20 As Chinese officials and
analysts have acknowledged in private, the U.S. military presence
in East Asia contributes to stability in the region, a
supporting, if not necessary, condition for continued economic
development in China.

U.S. Human Rights Charges. Beijing has had its difficulties
dealing with Washington, and vice-versa, on more-or-less pure
economic issues. More serious problems arise when, from Beijing's
perspective, Washington tries to infringe on Chinese sovereignty
by linking trade with Chinese domestic issues such as human
rights or labor standards. Even dissident Chinese opposed
Washington's unsuccessful effort to link human rights with mostfavored-nation status, and supported Beijing's uncompromising
stand. Predictably, Chinese condemn Washington's attempts to
impose its own definitions of human rights and democracy. They
are likely to view the imposition of sanctions for arms transfers
which Washington considers impermissible also as an infringement
of sovereignty, not to mention an example of the United States
using double standards.21
However, on most Sino-American disputes over economic
issues, even when the Chinese believe that the United States is
imposing unacceptable conditions, at least partial accommodation
is achieved after each side issues appropriate condemnations of
the other's position. The pragmatic interests of each side
prevail, if only momentarily, over ideological considerations.
But these accommodations are often resented and opposed by
factions in each capital. In Beijing, the opponents tend to use
the language of assertive, and sometimes aggressive, nationalism,
and include powerful figures within the PLA.22

The Issue of Taiwan. The most divisive issue of U.S.-China
relations has been the status of Taiwan. Through prolonged
negotiations in 1978 and 1982, the two sides reached an
accommodation whereby the United States acknowledged the Chinese
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position that Taiwan was a province of China, the United States
recognized that the PRC was the only government of China, China
recognized that the United States would continue to provide
Taiwan with presumably declining supplies of armaments, and each
implicitly agreed to repress their differences on this question
and pursue issues in which their interests might converge.23
However, the Chinese have never been happy with this compromise,
and commentaries frequently allege that Taiwan would already be
united with the mainland except for the United States.
Indeed, the Republic of China government on Taiwan was
protected from forcible reintegration with the mainland by the
deployment of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait after 1950
and the U.S.-Republic of China (ROC) Mutual Security Treaty of
1954. After normalization of U.S.-PRC relations and renunciation
of the U.S.-ROC treaty in 1979, continued unofficial relations
and economic contacts between Washington and Taipei (which
Beijing observers see as fostering continued unofficial relations
and economic contacts between Taipei and other nations),
contributed to Taiwan's economic success and ability to maintain
de facto independence from the PRC.
Relations between Beijing and Taipei since U.S.-PRC
normalization have been less bellicose than formerly-- Beijing no
longer calls for the "liberation" of Taiwan and neither side any
longer shells the other, although the PLA reportedly did fire
missiles over Taiwan into the Pacific Ocean in December 1995.24 In
fact, after far-reaching political changes on both sides of the
Strait, restrictions against travel have gradually been eased,
until the PRC will now admit almost any person from Taiwan, and
Taipei will permit a fairly broad--but not yet unrestricted--flow
of visitors from the mainland.25 It is economic contacts that are
most desired by Beijing and by Taiwan's business community.
Although Taipei has permitted indirect investment on the mainland
only since 1987, Taiwanese are already the second largest
"foreign" investors in China behind Hong Kong. As of 1993, they
had invested $13.2 billion in 20,612 enterprises, mostly in
Fujian Province, the area directly across the Strait from
Taiwan.26 Governmental contacts between Beijing and its erstwhile
province, increasingly required as more communications take
place, are conducted through two "unofficial" organizations, the
mainland Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
(ARATS) and the island-based Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF).
Beijing's current policy is to encourage greater across-thestrait contacts in the context of Deng Xiaoping's concept of "one
country, two systems," whereby Taiwan, like Hong Kong and Macau,
would become a "special administrative region" within the Chinese
state while retaining its own distinct economic and political
systems. It would become a local government with broad, but
somewhat vague, autonomy.27 As the government of the one China,
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only the PRC would be entitled to represent Taiwan
diplomatically, but Taiwan would still be permitted autonomous
economic and cultural contacts with other countries. Under "one
country, two systems," Beijing tolerates, and says it will
continue to tolerate when reunification occurs, separate Taiwan
membership in APEC, the Asian Development Bank, the International
Olympic Committee, and the World Trade Organization (after the
PRC is admitted) as long as it does not use the names Republic of
China or Taiwan. This policy was refined and expanded, with
emphasis on China's peaceful intentions, in President Jiang
Zemin's 1995 New Year's address.28 But while Beijing has
encouraged across-the-strait contacts, it has consistently
opposed efforts by Taipei to enlarge its international space by
gaining formal diplomatic relations with other countries or by
joining international organizations.
As Taipei has pushed for wider recognition under the
"pragmatic diplomacy" of President Lee Teng-hui, who succeeded
Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, Beijing has increased its efforts to
keep Taiwan diplomatically isolated. Against the background of
so-called unofficial visits by Lee to several Southeast Asian
countries and Taipei's campaign for membership in the United
Nations, Beijing launched unprecedented personal attacks against
Lee, using all of its propaganda assets, after he concluded his
now famous "private" visit to Cornell University in June 1995. He
was condemned as an enemy of the Chinese people determined to
prevent unity.29 The words were reinforced by an extensive
military exercise close to Taiwan which featured tests in the
South China Sea (150 kilometers north of Taipei) of surface-tosurface missiles with ranges adequate to strike the island. The
PLA also conducted other military exercises in the vicinity of
the island shortly before Taiwan's legislative elections in
December 1995. Tensions were undoubtedly higher than at any other
time since U.S.-PRC rapprochement. Even during the most tense
period, however, economic activities continued, including new
investments and arrangements.30
President Clinton's decision in May 1995 to reverse the
State Department, which had informed China that Lee would not be
granted a visa, and allow President Lee to accept an award from
Cornell University was the proximate cause of the downturn in
Taiwan-China relations. The decision, made under strong
congressional pressure, also led to what most observers called
the lowest point in U.S.-China relations since 1979. The
extraordinary vehemence of the Chinese reaction surprised many
American observers, including officials of both executive and
congressional branches of government. The reaction is less
difficult to understand in the context of the attitudes of some
Chinese policymakers.
To an influential segment of the Chinese elite, including
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parts of the PLA, the United States had been pursuing deliberate
programs of containment and "peaceful evolution" directed against
China since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Three recent U.S.
actions had reconfirmed their beliefs and given credibility to
their arguments among other members of the elite. The first was
President Bush's decision, made during his reelection campaign,
that Taiwan could purchase 150 F-16 fighter aircraft from General
Dynamics, a company laying off personnel because of falling
Pentagon orders. While the official reaction in Beijing was
relatively restrained, Bush's decision was viewed as a gross
violation of the Shanghai Communique. The second was the Clinton
administration's review of policy toward Taiwan, which resulted
in the change of the name of the office handling Taiwan's affairs
in the United States from the "North American Coordination
Council" to the "Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative
Office in the United States" and the easing of restrictions on
the access of Taiwanese officials to U.S. officials. U.S. Cabinet
officers were also permitted to make "private visits" to Taipei.31
The third disturbing development was the publication by the U.S.
Department of Defense of the United States Security Strategy for
the East Asia-Pacific Region in February 1995. It seemed to imply
that China was a threat to the security of East Asia, and also
declared that the United States would keep military forces in the
region to assure stability indefinitely.32 The first two actions
were seen as support for the contention that the United States
wanted to keep China divided and weak, and the third appeared to
them as proof of a U.S. goal of hegemony over East Asia, and
therefore China.
The decision to permit Lee's visit seemed to be the
proverbial last straw and a totally unacceptable attack on
Chinese national integrity and sovereignty. In the context of the
struggle to succeed Deng, Jiang and Vice Premier/ Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen could not afford to appear soft in the face
of the U.S. action, although there is no evidence that they would
have reacted less forcefully had their positions been more
secure. In any case, the reaction was immediate and unprecedented
in its intensity.
As must have been expected, Beijing protested that Clinton's
decision represented a "two China" or "one China, one Taiwan"
policy, in clear violation of the Shanghai Communique and other
U.S.-China understandings, and canceled high-level visits. But
Beijing also recalled its ambassador in Washington for
consultations, suspended scheduled discussions on the missile
control regime with Washington, and launched a vituperative
propaganda campaign against the United States and, as previously
mentioned, Lee Teng-hui. The propaganda against Washington was
unusually extensive, pervasive, and prolonged.33 These latter
actions seem to have been more than President Clinton or the
congressional critics of U.S. policy anticipated.
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That the crisis atmosphere in U.S.-China relations had begun
to subside by August, only 3 months after Lee received his visa,
reflects the belief of both governments that bilateral relations
are extremely important. The problem might not have reached such
dangerous proportions except for domestic political problems--a
new Republican majority in Congress with a anti-Beijing bias
harping at President Clinton, and hard liners in Beijing seeking
position for the more open succession struggle which will occur
when Deng dies. But it also reflects the reality that diverging
U.S. and Chinese interests and values limit bilateral cooperation
and present opportunities for conflict in the absence of a common
enemy. From Beijing's perspective, the factors underlying the
crisis of 1995 are still present: the U.S. "one China" policy is
still unacceptable to Beijing because it provides too much
latitude to Taipei, and U.S. human rights and trade policy
amounts to intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign
China. U.S.-China relations are likely to remain troubled.
Japan. From Beijing's perspective, ties with Washington and
Tokyo are clearly interrelated, and can be manipulated to its own
advantage.
Beijing has sought to use the prospect of improved political
and economic relations with Japan to induce Washington to be more
politically cooperative, to elicit more American investment in
China, and to encourage Washington to relax a variety of postTiananmen sanctions. Conversely, until Tokyo fully and
convincingly renounces its military history for the latter part
of the 19th century and the first 45 years of the 20th, China
will want the United States to act as a brake on any expanding
Japanese military role in the region. Also, Beijing will use
Tokyo's ceaseless quest for market share and the specter of
American penetration of the Chinese market as a means to extract
maximally favorable commercial, aid, investment, and technology
terms from Japan.34
Whether China has been successful in exploiting the BeijingWashington-Tokyo triangle, its ties with Japan seem orderly and
beneficial compared to those with the United States. But there
have been peaks and valleys. Tokyo imposed economic sanctions on
Beijing after the Tiananmen massacre, and reduced Official
Development Assistance (ODA) grants to China from $81.2 million
in 1994 to $5.2 million for 1995 as a protest to Beijing for its
nuclear tests in 1995.35 However, Tokyo rescinded the sanctions
sooner than any other nation, and its penalty for nuclear testing
may also not be long lasting. And Beijing, through diplomatic
protests and media blasts, has frequently called Tokyo to task
for misrepresenting its history or for claiming sovereignty over
Diaoyo Islands, a disputed uninhabited island group in the East
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China Sea which the Japanese call Senkaku Islands. These have
been largely pro forma exercises, however, partly to exploit the
Japanese sense of guilt.36
Beijing's current criticism of Japan, which has exceeded the
level of negative commentary of the recent past, has centered on
two themes: Japan-Taiwan relations, which Beijing considers
unnecessarily close and unacceptably political, that resulted in
a Taiwan vice-premier attending the 1994 Asiad in Hiroshima and a
number of "unofficial" contacts between high officials of the two
governments,37 and Tokyo's decision to revoke ODA grants to China
because it resumed nuclear tests. Beijing has said, forcefully
and repeatedly, that the imposition of a political test for ODA
violates the principle of separating economics and politics,
which heretofore Tokyo had relatively faithfully followed. Rather
than criticize what it considers a wholly justifiable testing
program, Beijing has suggested that Tokyo would do better to
consider its own serious transgressions which resulted in
countless losses and unspeakable pain to China and other Asian
countries.
On the other hand, in the last several years there have been
reciprocal high level visits intended to symbolize a warm and
developing bilateral relationship. Beijing has sent its highest
officials, President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng to Tokyo,
while several Japanese Prime Ministers and even Emperor Akihito,
the first Emperor ever to enter China, have visited Beijing.
Economic concerns have dominated China's official relations
with Japan, and although Beijing may have preferred greater
Japanese investments and more favorable treatment on some
agreements, the Sino-Japanese economic relationship has served
both parties--certainly China--well. China was the number one or
two recipient of Japanese ODA from 1982 until 1994,38 and Japan
was China's largest trading partner and second or third largest
export market after Hong Kong.39 Sino-Japanese relations clearly
have supported China's modernization drive, especially as
Japanese businessmen have increased their investment in more
capital intensive industries during the late 1980s and 1990s.40
These are the current outward expressions of China's policy
toward Japan--the tatemae, to use the Japanese word, or surface
aspects of Sino-Japanese relations. There is also the underlying
reality, or honne.41 Chinese analysts and officials, as well as
the larger public, are much less benign about Japanese
motivations, or future Japanese action, than formal diplomatic
discourse may suggest. In short, based on a century of sporadic
conflict which included Japan's cruel occupation in the 1930s and
1940s, Chinese of all walks of life, including the elite, are
deeply suspicious and fearful of what a politically active and
militarily powerful Japan might do.42 This has been clear in
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reactions to Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the U.N.
Security Council and the passage of the peacekeeping
authorization bill and subsequent deployment of Self-Defense
Forces on U.N. peacekeeping missions. Moreover, they simply do
not like most Japanese. At the same time, consensus among Chinese
analysts that Japan's economic ascendancy will continue, despite
current problems, eventually eclipsing the United States, is also
part of the honne of China's view of Japan.43 As a result, Beijing
strives to engage Japan for aid, investment, and trade, in
support of its modernization and development, but also harbors
great anxiety about future Japanese political roles.
The Japanese Angle.
Japan is gradually emerging from almost complete dependence
on the United States in the political and security aspects of
foreign policy. While Tokyo had pursued a vigorous independent
foreign economic policy for decades, it is not too great an
oversimplification to say that during the Cold War the primary
goal for the political and security aspects of Japan's foreign
policy was simply to sustain its alliance with the United
States.44 Washington provided security in the form of the nuclear
umbrella and forward deployed forces on Japanese soil, all
guaranteed by the Mutual Security Treaty (MST). In return, Japan
provided the United States with military bases and a formidable
barrier to Soviet expansion. Moreover, Japan was permitted to
avoid major expenditures for defense, focusing virtually its
entire energy and resources on economic recovery and economic
expansion. The primary cost to Japan: deference to the United
States in all major foreign policy decisions.
This division of labor and responsibility had broad support
among the business-oriented conservatives who ruled Japan after
1955.45 The alliance with the United States was a major factor in
the phenomenal economic achievements of Japanese business and
government. It also was compatible with the pervasive support for
pacifism among Japanese, who considered themselves--not the
populations of countries invaded by Japan--the most abused
victims of Japan's military-dominated governments and the great
Pacific War itself.46 Because of the alliance, Japan could enjoy
security and its pacifist constitution. While Tokyo did establish
armed forces--Self-Defense Forces (SDF)--because of U.S.
pressure, they remained small and very carefully controlled by
civilian authority. To a significant degree the alliance served
the interests of all Japanese political groups except extreme
nationalists on the right and communists on the left.
A combination of factors have forced Tokyo to reevaluate its
international posture. The most important undoubtedly centered on
the changes in the international system resulting from the end of
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the Cold War and the economic advances of most Northeast Asian
nations. The disintegration of the Soviet Union removed the
fundamental purpose of the alliance with the United States.
Moreover, the United States had changed: the world's leading
creditor nation in 1980, it was the world's leading debtor nation
by 1990. Its economy seemed stagnant, and its citizens appeared
to be unwilling to continue to bear the burdens of international
leadership. Many Japanese questioned that Washington would remain
engaged in Northeast Asia, either formally or in practice
abandoning its Cold War alliances with Japan and the ROK.
Japan had also changed. By 1990, it was the world's largest
creditor nation, and, in neomercantilist fashion, it enjoyed a
massive current account surplus, especially with its major
customer, the United States. In fact, trade friction was becoming
more salient to many Japanese (and Americans) than security
cooperation in the U.S.-Japan relationship. To many Japanese,
this situation reinforced the belief that Japan could no longer
rely on the alliance with the United States as the fundamental
anchor of foreign policy. And no doubt many Japanese believed
that dependence on the United States had become unnecessary.
Japan was the nation that worked, the nation, many believed,
destined clearly to be number one, if it wasn't already. It must
be stressed that other members of the Japanese elite, probably
always a majority, resisted any significant change in Japan's
international posture which might require that Japan assume
greater responsibility, risks, or costs in international
politics. And this view that Japan should remain passive in
international politics had broad support in the electorate.
Discussions over Japan's proper international role,
previously mostly confined to intellectual journals and academic
meetings, became a prominent, public national debate during the
1990 Gulf War, when many Western observers, including government
officials, criticized Tokyo for not providing military personnel
and equipment in support of the coalition expelling Iraq from
Kuwait.47 Its large contribution of money without risking
personnel was not considered adequate. In agonizing interchanges
which reflected the Japanese people's abhorrence and fear of the
military and the pervasive pacifism which are legacies of the
Second World War, as well as voices for change, a partial,
tentative resolution was reached in 1992 with the passage of a
Peacekeeping Bill (PKO) by the Diet.48 It permits the
participation of SDF in limited U.N. peacekeeping operations, the
first time since 1945 that Japanese military forces were
authorized any security role but defense of the homeland. The
restrictions in the bill are severe, prohibiting any activities
which go beyond classic, neutral peacekeeping.49 However, the real
significance of the act transcends its particular provisions; the
PKO bill represented Japan's first formal recognition that it has
responsibilities for international security beyond rhetorical and
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financial support for the United States and the United Nations,
and providing financial aid to poorer nations.
The debate about how Japan should attempt to meet these
responsibilities will continue well into the future, and will be
influenced not only by changes in Japan's environment, but also
by the shape of its domestic political system, now undergoing
substantial--perhaps profound-- structural change. But even in
the period since the passage of the PKO bill, when domestic
politics has been uncharacteristically unstable and politicians
have necessarily focused their energies on partisan issues, the
national consensus on security and Japan's international role has
been shifting. When the PKO bill was finally narrowly adopted
after extended legislative debate, the idea of deploying SelfDefense Forces outside Japan for peacekeeping purposes was
supported by less than a majority of the population.50 However, in
a short time it was accepted fairly generally, and SDF have
participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations in Cambodia,
Mozambique, Rwanda/Zaire, and the Golan Heights without
significant opposition at elite or electorate levels.51 Moreover,
the Japanese government has continued its efforts to increase its
influence in the United Nations and support multilateral security
dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, both activities which have
received emphasis only in the post-Cold War era. The inclusion of
two pacifist parties in the shaky governing coalition in 1994 did
cause the foreign ministry to soft-peddle, if not suspend, its
campaign for Japan to become a permanent member of the Security
Council, but the idea has support among a significant segment of
the elite.52 Japan has also continued to support the alliance with
the United States as the foundation of Japanese defense and
security policy.
While the outcome of Japan's domestic political conflict is
uncertain, there is virtually no possibility that political power
will shift from mainstream groups unless there is some kind of
totally unexpected crisis. On the other hand, it does seem
probable that the younger politicians who will move into
positions of prominence will support pragmatic foreign policy
decisions which expand Japan's regional and global roles without
significantly weakening the alliance with the United States.53 The
confidence nurtured in decades of economic success, which might
have emboldened youthful nationalists, has been softened, if not
destroyed, by the current recession and the startling
inadequacies of Japanese social and technical institutions
revealed by the earthquake which destroyed much of Kobe, the
poisonous gas attacks on Tokyo subways, and the subsequent
discovery of the mysterious sect which had developed and
prospered within Japan's presumably well-ordered society.54
Japan's neighbors express concern about its potential
military capability.55 Japan does have modern military
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organizations, the Self-Defense Forces. During the Cold War,
expenditures on the SDF, while rarely exceeding 1 percent of GNP,
increased about 5 percent every year, as Japan gradually deployed
state-of-the-art defensive weapons and equipment to meet the
requirements of its National Defense Program Outline, designed
solely for defense in conjunction with the United States. The
budget for the Defense Agency may now be the second largest in
the world, depending on how one calculates China's military
expenditures, a fact often cited to emphasize the potential
threat from Japan. Budgets are a notoriously poor measure of
military capability, however, and that is doubly so in the case
of the Self-Defense Forces because of the appreciation of the yen
and high personnel and equipment costs in Japan. More
significantly, the Defense Agency and the Self- Defense Forces
are not valued institutions in Japanese society, and their
activities are closely circumscribed by constitutional, legal,
political, and social limitations. Finally, they are constrained
and regulated by the alliance with the United States, a factor
reassuring to most East Asians.
United States. Much of the foreign policy debate in Tokyo
has focused on whether Japan should emphasize its alliance with
the United States as a global partnership, or focus on linking
Japan with the rest of Asia. The debate is ongoing, and its
eventual outcome may eventually establish the conceptual basis
for long-range Japanese foreign policy, but for the present, the
bureaucracy, with the acquiesce of Cabinet and Diet, have opted
for the emphasis on the alliance with the United States. This is
most clearly expressed in two official documents, the Defense of
Japan 1995, the Defense Agency's annual white paper, and the new
National Defense Program Outline, which replaces a 1976 version,
published in 1995.56 The latter especially develops the rationale
for the SDF and its modernization based on U.S. regional strategy
as expressed in United States Security Strategy for the East
Asia-Pacific Region. Japan has also increased its attention to
Asia, however, maintaining a supportive role in the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) organization and nurturing its bilateral relations with
most East Asian countries, including those (like Burma and, until
recently, Vietnam) with strained relations with the United
States. But Tokyo has declined to participate in the East Asian
Economic Caucus, a pet project of Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir, because it excludes Australia, Canada, and the United
States.
Even Japanese who believe that Tokyo is too subservient to
Washington recognize that Japan's relations with the United
States are more important than those with any other nation. The
United States is Japan's largest market for exports and the
largest source of imports.57 There is a high degree of
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interdependency in the service and financial sectors of both
countries' economies. And Japan, as during the Cold War, still
consciously designs its defense on the basis of the Mutual
Security Treaty (MST) with the United States, even though the
putative enemy, the Soviet Union, no longer exists.
In the last few years, both governments seemed to have
focused more energy on the economic aspects of their relations,
where there is the greatest disagreement, than on political and
security affairs, where there is a high degree of harmony. The
Japanese press dwells on U.S. demands for greater access to
Japanese markets, frequently echoing government arguments about
the unfairness, and sometimes immorality and illegality, of U.S.
positions. Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International
Trade and Industry contentions that the cause of U.S. trade
deficits can be found in America's low saving rates, bad
management, and bad marketing rather than alleged Japanese trade
barriers resonate well among all Japanese. The rapid sequence of
one trade crisis after another and the frequently strident tone
of U.S. pronouncements clearly has affected public and elite
attitudes about the United States. But because relations with the
United States are critical, each crisis resulting from U.S.
demands for more open markets is partially solved, usually
through a last moment partial accommodation by Japan, which then
propels the two sides toward a new problem destined, in time, to
become another crisis.
Tokyo and Washington have both attempted to isolate security
issues from contentious economic ones, so far with reasonable
success. In spite of tensions over trade, the military
organizations of each nation have close relations with the other,
to include educational and high level exchanges and frequent
exercises.58 Japan provides greater financial support for U.S.
forces stationed within the country than any other government, so
that it is less expensive for the United States to station
military personnel in Japan than in the United States itself.59
While there have been problems related to respective defense
industries, virtually all military equipment for the SDF not
produced in Japan comes from the United States. Moreover, Tokyo
supports almost all U.S. security initiatives politically and
financially. For example, Japan is providing a significant
financial contribution in support of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed
Framework for the construction of light-water reactors in North
Korea.60 It has also aligned itself with U.S. policy toward Bosnia
and the peace process in the Middle East.
Japanese policy does diverge from U.S. positions with
respect to Russia. Rather than a potential partner in a structure
for global peace, Tokyo views Moscow more as an antagonist,
despite the end of the Cold War. Russia still occupies the
Northern Territories, the southernmost islands of the Kurile
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chain which Japanese hold to be legally and historically an
integral part of Japan. The economic and strategic significance
of these islands is very limited, but they have become a symbol
of Japanese nationalism, and genuine rapprochement with Russia
seems unlikely as long as it occupies what Tokyo considers a
small part of Japan. Moreover, Russia's post-war deployments in
Japan's neighborhood are still substantial, although Russian
military activity in the region has been minimal in the last
several years. Indeed, Japan and Russia have not negotiated a
peace treaty since the end of World War II. And from Tokyo's
perspective, there is very limited potential economic benefit
from cooperation with Russia. The Maritime Provinces contain few
investment opportunities because of poor infrastructure, an
inflexible bureaucracy, and a generally unreformed political
elite. Since Russia's Far East is sparsely populated and
underdeveloped, it is also a poor market for Japanese goods. Any
support for integrating Moscow into the Western political orbit
is given without enthusiasm in response to U.S. pressure.
The rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl by three U.S.
servicemen in October 1995 focused attention on some of the
unpleasant consequences of basing U.S. forces in Japan. The
highly publicized crime also inflamed opposition to U.S. bases in
Okinawa and reinforced the widely held stereotype of the United
States as a violent society. These negative attitudes could be
aggregated with economic concerns to seriously undermine popular
support for the alliance, particularly the presence of U.S.
forces within Japan.61 Indeed, in the aftermath of the Okinawa
incident there have been many calls for the MST to be reviewed,
usually implying that U.S. forces should be reduced or withdrawn.
It can now be politically rewarding in Japan to attack
Washington. Officially, however, the Japanese government
commitment to the MST is firm, although it is seeking adjustments
to basing arrangements on Okinawa. Tokyo had not yet presented a
public argument to develop support in the Diet and the public for
retaining 47,000 U.S. forces in Japan at the beginning of 1996.
China. Japan's relations with China are more important than
ties with any other nation except the United States. The economic
significance of the relationship has increased with the growth of
the Chinese economy, the implementation of reforms in China, and
the appreciation of the yen.62 In 1994, China was Japan's second
largest trading partner, with slightly more than one fourth the
volume of Japan-U.S. trade, and sixth largest market.63 Japan not
only bought energy resources, which accounted for most of its
imports from China in 1980, but also a variety of manufactured
goods and foodstuffs.64
With the appreciation of the yen and the conclusion of
several steps to protect Japanese investors,65 Japanese private
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investment has also increased, although it still accounts for a
very small portion of total Japanese private foreign investment.66
Japan ranks fourth among foreign investors in China. However,
small and medium sized Japanese businesses particularly have
found China an attractive market for investment. They must
confront problems of poor infrastructure, changing rules, rigid
bureaucracy, and corruption, as do all foreign investors in
China, but the potential rewards are nonetheless apparently more
than sufficient.
Like Beijing, Tokyo has sought to foster these economic
interactions, a major reason why it also has worked hard to
maintain friendly Japan-China relations overall. As noted in the
discussion of Chinese policy toward Japan, there have been
frequent consultations on all aspects of the bilateral
relationship and exchanges of the highest level officials, and
China has regularly been one of the major benefactors of Japanese
ODA. In its foreign and security policy deliberations, Japanese
officials are always solicitous about the impact decisions will
have on Asian neighbors, particularly South Korea and China.
Tokyo, which established formal diplomatic relations with Beijing
shortly after the Nixon shokku (shock) of 1971, has also acted as
its advocate, notably when Japan broke ranks with other G7
countries and suspended sanctions against China at the G7 meeting
in 1990.67 Informally, Tokyo also attempts to mediate between
Beijing and Washington, at least to the extent that it urges
caution and restraint on each side.
The two strains of present Japanese policy which seem to
most concern the Chinese--suspension of most grant ODA to Beijing
and alleged flirtation with a "two China" or "one China, one
Taiwan" policy--are based on two different influences on Japanese
policymaking. The former represents the Cabinet's and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs' response to the governing coalition's
indignation, as expressed by the parties' foreign affairs
coordination subcommittee, that Beijing ignored Tokyo's repeated
demand that China forgo any testing of nuclear devices, and the
pervasive significance of anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan. This
was an unusual development in Japanese decisionmaking, where
foreign policy is normally hammered out through bargaining among
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI), other interested
ministries, and perhaps the Cabinet or groups within the Diet,
but almost never including political parties or agencies of
political parties. MOFA's response to the coalition was typically
limited and cautious. ODA grants to China have never been very
large. Denying all grants to China except those for humanitarian
and emergency purposes (estimated to be $4 million) reduced
China's potential by 95 percent from 1994 levels, but still
eliminated only $74 million.68 But with cabinet approval, MOFA
rejected the subcommittee request that ODA loans for China, which
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totalled a much more significant $1.4 billion in 1994, also be
reviewed, arguing that the loan program was necessary for the
development of good long-term relations with China.69 Thus,
Tokyo's sanction was largely symbolic, although probably resented
as much by Beijing as more coercive economic sanctions would have
been, and in response to pressures which probably only would be
mobilized on nuclear weapons issues, always highly emotional in
Japan.
The issue of Taiwan is probably less disruptive of SinoJapanese relations than Sino-American relations, but it has been
a cause of much acrimony in the past and probably will be again
in the future. Japanese investment in Taiwan exceeds that in
China, and Taiwan is also a major Japanese trading partner.
Moreover, Taiwan occupies a special status for many in the
Japanese political elite because of the special relationship
developed during the long period of Japanese control (1895-1945),
and the ties of Japanese and Taiwanese businessmen forged in the
post-war period. Thus, there is likely to be continued support
for Japan's "unofficial" ties with Taiwan, especially among
business groups but also the bureaucracy. It would be surprising
if the resulting advocacy for Taiwan did not conflict with
Beijing's narrow perception of the proper role for its renegade
province in international affairs.
The U.S. Angle.
Unlike in the mid 1980s, when containing the Soviet Union
was still the central focus of U.S. foreign policy, Washington
today is likely to cite the economic dynamism of Northeast Asia
and the increasingly important trade between the United States
and the region to rationalize and justify U.S. activities there.70
Economics has been an important element of U.S. policy in the
region for decades, but as Northeast Asian economies continue to
grow and regional security concerns (with the important exception
of the DPRK) become less immediate, relatively greater attention,
in activities and rhetoric, is placed on economic relations.
Even a casual examination of data validates this emphasis.71
U.S. trade with Northeast Asia was $300 billion in 1994. That is,
the four economies of the region (International Monetary Fund
records do not indicate any U.S.-DPRK trade) accounted for 25
percent of all U.S. trade, including that with Canada, Mexico,
and the European Union! Moveover, while only China is expected to
have rates of growth in the near future as high as in Southeast
Asia, the rates of growth for the region as a whole are expected
to surpass those of most other U.S. trading partners. In other
words, Northeast Asia should account for an even larger and
growing share of total U.S. trade, when compared to developed
countries, for at least the balance of the century. Most of this
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trade ($202 billion) took the form of imports, but Northeast Asia
was nonetheless also a good market for U.S. commodities. The four
economies absorbed $97.9 billion of U.S. exports in 1994, almost
as much as all of the members of the European Union ($101
billion).
Economics has only displaced security as a foreign policy
priority in a relative sense, however. U.S. security interests in
Northeast Asia are still extremely important also. Maintaining
regional stability is the overarching long-term security interest
of the United States in Northeast Asia, as it has been since the
end of the Cold War. It is interrelated with U.S. regional
economic objectives in that stability helps provide an
environment which fosters the economic dynamism of Northeast
Asia; and stability allows U.S. businesses, employing U.S.
workers, to participate in that economic prosperity. Stability is
also a necessary condition for the security of U.S. possessions
and territories in East Asia and the Pacific, as well as U.S.
allies in the region.
From the U.S. perspective, there are two sources of
challenges to regional stability. One is the very nature of an
evolving international system characterized by decentralization
and diffusion of power. Uncertainty has replaced the more-or-less
predictable patterns of behavior associated with the bipolar
structure of the Cold War. That uncertainty is not only derived
from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which once could act
as a restraint on North Korea, but more noticeably from the
widely held perception in Japan that the United States, fatigued
from carrying the burdens of world leadership and plagued by
unfavorable economic conditions at home, will disengage from the
region. If the United States disengages from Northeast Asia, many
regional leaders foresee the reemergence of old antagonisms and a
greatly enhanced possibility of conflict, probably involving
China and/or Japan.72 One of their responses to this perceived
uncertainly has been to modernize and enlarge their military
capabilities.

U.S. Strategic Concepts for Northeast Asia. The United
States continues to try to provide assurance that it will remain
engaged in Northeast Asia through its security cooperation
programs and forward military presence. Bilateral relationships
between the United States and nations in the region have been the
principal basis for U.S. security policy since the 1950s. These
include not only the formal mutual security alliances with Japan
and the R.O.K., but also the less formal security relationships
with China and Taiwan. During the Cold War they provided an
extremely effective way for the United States to optimally
mobilize the very diverse nations of East Asia to advance U.S.
security objectives, specifically the containment of the Soviet
Union. These bilateral relationships can still be mutually
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beneficial and provide the United States with the ability to
influence regional events. Moreover, to precipitously eliminate
or undermine these ties would be very destabilizing, and clearly
not contribute to regional stability.
"Forward military presence," the second principal strategic
concept of U.S. security policy, is broader than "forward
deployed forces," the terminology of the Cold War, in that the
latter have a specific mission of deterrence and defense against
an identified enemy.73 On the other hand, personnel who make-up
forward military presence, which accounts for most U.S. forces in
the Pacific, may have more ambiguous military missions designed
to achieve the political objective of providing assurance of a
stable regional order for friends and allies. These include
contingency planning and training, often in combined exercises
with the military of regional states, and other military-tomilitary contacts. As in Korea, they may still have the
deterrence mission of forward deployed forces. At the same time,
if they are to remain credible, forward military presence forces
must have the capability to perform a variety of real combat
missions which might be required in the region in addition to
peace time, noncombat tasks.
If forward military presence in Northeast Asia provides
assurance that the region will remain relatively stable, then
providing that assurance satisfies the broad objectives of the
United States. As U.S. Government spokesmen frequently assert,
military presence not only allows the United States to influence
military balances and prevents resort to violence in some
disputes, but more importantly, it permits the United States to
be an "honest broker," mediating among contestants to find
acceptable solutions.74 Honest brokers will also be present to
defend their own interests and gain intimate knowledge about
regional developments which could influence their own objectives
in the future. And they have access to decisionmaking centers
within the region, also an objective of U.S. policy.

The U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. The second source of
potential instability is an overt challenge from the weakest
government in the region, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK). It confronts the U.S.-ROK Alliance with the most
robust security threat left over from the Cold War, plus a
recently imposed regional and global threat to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, whose preservation is a
high priority global interest of the United States.75
The traditional approaches of alliances and forward deployed
forces were, by themselves, inappropriate to deal with the North
Korean nuclear threat unless the United States and its allies
were to physically disarm Pyongyang, an option Washington never
seriously considered. Rightly or wrongly, the Clinton
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administration also rejected, after first attempting to mobilize,
international political and economic sanctions. Instead, it
pursued, through tortuous negotiations, a "positive-sum" formula
which provided economic benefits for Pyongyang, curtailment of
North Korea's alleged nuclear weapons program for Washington and
allies, and the expectation of dialogue between the two rival
Korean governments for Seoul. This solution, enshrined in the
DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework of 1994, was probably unprecedented
for the resolution of a security issue, and would have been
literally unthinkable in the bipolar world of the Cold War.
The Agreed Framework and the processes of obtaining and
implementing it illustrate several characteristics of U.S.
relations with Northeast Asian nations. Without the Cold War
structure for assigning priorities, Washington continually had
difficulty reconciling its objectives of regional stability and
security of the ROK with the global objectives of stopping
Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and protecting the integrity
of the NPT. Tensions between Washington and Seoul also developed
frequently during the negotiations leading up to agreement, and
have continued during implementation of the complex terms of the
Agreed Framework.76 While some of these difficulties are inherent
in the general language of the Framework, some are also
inevitable because of the diffuse and decentralized character of
Northeast Asia's regional system which does not permit one
government to dictate terms to others.
The agreement with the DPRK, requiring as it did the
participation of at least South Korea and Japan and the
acquiescence of China, could only have been engineered by the
United States. No other government had the necessary stature and
capability. Moreover, its successful implementation will also be
impossible without the leadership of Washington. Therefore, in
order to attain important security objectives (which, in turn,
permit striving for economic objectives), the United States must
remain directly involved in the installation of light water
reactors in North Korea, destruction of the DPRK's existing
nuclear capability, determination of how much plutonium was
processed before 1994, and resumption of a substantive dialogue
by Seoul and Pyongyang, among other things. This will be a
demanding responsibility which may require more than a decade to
fulfill.77

New Emphases in U.S. Policy. In addition to placing primacy
on economics, there have been two other changes in Washington's
approach to Northeast Asia. First, Northeast Asia--actually the
entire Pacific Rim--has been awarded a higher priority than in
previous decades compared to the rest of the world, especially
Europe. There have been relatively more visits by high level
personnel, including the President, who have categorically
asserted the importance of Asia and the Pacific to the United
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States. Moreover, in military terms it is no longer an "economy
of force" theater, as in the Cold War. U.S. Security Policy for
Asia and the Pacific prescribes that the United States will
deploy about 100,000 military personnel--approximately as many as
will be in Europe--for the foreseeable future.78 The attention to
the Middle East and the Balkans in 1995 may have diminished this
priority somewhat, but the Asia-Pacific region, especially
Northeast Asia, still retains a historically high focus in U.S.
policy.
The third change in U.S. policy toward the region is the
support for multilateralism as a means of dealing with East
Asia's security problems. In the Bush administration,
multilateralism was rejected in favor of reliance entirely on
existing bilateral alliances. The best security structure for the
region was said to consist of a fan "with its base in North
America and radiating west across the Pacific, to U.S. security
partners in Asia-Pacific."79 The Clinton administration has
reaffirmed existing security alliances, but also called for "new
machinery," multilateral in character, to supplement U.S.
bilateral arrangements in dealing with existing and, more
importantly, emerging security problems. Washington does not
advocate comprehensive agencies like a Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Asia or a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization.
Presumably the multilateral agencies are to be constructed for
specific problems and vary in membership and structure as
required. According to President Clinton:
The challenge for the Asian Pacific in this decade . .
. is to develop multiple new arrangements to meet
multiple threats and opportunities. These arrangements
can function like overlapping plates of armor,
individually providing protection and together covering
the full body of our common security concerns.80
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO),
established under the Agreed Framework, may illustrate this
multilateral concept--it is the only new multilateral arrangement
to emerge in Northeast Asia. It was created to meet a special
need, the problem of providing North Korea with light water
reactors, and it includes a limited membership--only those
governments willing and able to contribute--and a structure which
recognizes special authority for members with especially heavy
contributions.81
The Clinton administration has rhetorically placed great
emphasis on the two Asia-Pacific fora, The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations-Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC)
and the new ASEAN Regional Forum. They include China, Japan,
South Korea, and the United States, but their membership is much
broader and, as creatures of ASEAN, they do not necessarily give
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priority to Northeast Asian concerns. Washington is also
participating in a new forum for security dialogues among Japan,
South Korea, and the United States. It has also expressed
willingness to participate in security discussions or a security
structure related to Korea after the nonproliferation issue has
been resolved. And Washington has been a prime sponsor of "track
two" discussions which involve China, Japan, South Korea, Russia,
and the United States. North Korea has been invited, but so far
has declined to take part. China, of course, will not allow the
participation of Taiwan. On the other hand, Washington did not
support the Russian initiative of March 1994 to form a
multilateral forum to deal with the North Korea nuclear weapons
problem.82 In fact, although Washington consulted frequently with
Seoul and Tokyo, and to a lesser extent with Beijing and Moscow,
the format for consultations, as well as negotiations with the
DPRK, was bilateral.
China. If "China's...most troubling bilateral relationship
is with the United States" among its Northeast Asian ties, the
reverse is certainly also true.83 Most of the time since the end
of the Cold War, which more-or-less coincided with the massacre
at Tiananmen Square, U.S.-China relations have been rocky at
best. And while Beijing may not be relatively as important to
Washington as Washington is to Beijing, the United States
obviously does place great significance on China.
China necessarily affects U.S. economic and security
interests in all of the Asia-Pacific area, including Northeast
Asia. The reasons for China's importance are well known, and will
only be summarized here.84
Economically, China is a very large and growing market,
purchasing some $114.6 billion of items from foreign sources in
1994, up from $52.5 billion in 1990,85 and $42.5 billion in 1985.86
So far, the United States has not commanded a large share of that
market, particularly when compared to China's sales to the United
States. Overall, China was the sixth largest trading partner of
the United States in 1994 with bilateral trade totalling $50.6
billion, but 81.7 percent of the trade consisted of Chinese
exports to the United States.87 However, as China continues to
develop and modernize its economy, its demand for U.S. goods and
services should increase; China is potentially an exceedingly
profitable American market. With a more stable business regime,
China could also be a very attractive market for U.S. investment,
which only totalled $8.2 billion in 1993.88 The sometimes
aggressive activities of the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative are designed to increase the access of U.S.
businesses (and in the process, other foreign businesses as
well), enticing, cajoling, or forcing China to lower trade
barriers and respect intellectual property rights. Progress has
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been spotty, with occasional breakthroughs in the form of broad
agreements which are then inadequately or unevenly enforced by
Beijing. Undoubtedly, Washington desires smooth relations with
Beijing in order to increase the prospects of economic advantage
from that relationship.
In the security and political spheres, Beijing is also
important for the success of U.S. initiatives. For instance,
Washington sought and apparently obtained support from Beijing
during the negotiations with Pyongyang which resulted in the
Agreed Framework, and on other issues relating to the Korean
peninsula. The United States also needs, but less frequently
obtains, the compliance of China, a nuclear power and arms
exporter, to perfect the global nonproliferation regime it seeks
to establish.
China is also, in regional terms, a major military power.
Indeed, the PLA's order of battle contains more units with more
personnel, more tanks, and more airplanes, than any other
military organization anywhere.89 Most of its equipment is not
technologically advanced, however, and it has limited
capabilities to project power beyond its borders.90 But PLA
official budgets are on the rise, modernization efforts are
underway, and China clearly has the potential to develop and
deploy military capabilities which could threaten its neighbors
and U.S. interests. By installing structures with possible
military uses in disputed areas of the Spratly Islands and
explicitly leveling military threats against Taiwan, Beijing has
stimulated concern among its neighbors and many American
observers. Beijing's assertion that the PLA is not a threat to
any other nation would be more likely to be believed if there
were more reliable information about its budget, structure, and
doctrine. Such information is treated as military secrets now.
China's military posture and the secrecy about it are two factors
which trouble U.S. relations with China. The issues of human
rights and Taiwan are perhaps the most difficult.
After PLA units fired on the Tiananmen demonstrators on June
4, 1989, President Bush imposed commercial sanctions.91 Those
sanctions which did not involve strategic materials were eased in
the next several months, but U.S.-PRC military-to-military
contacts were not resumed until 1994. Through all of the period,
the United States regularly charged China with egregious human
rights violations through annual State Department reports, MFN
debates, and reactions to Beijing's behavior with respect to
dissidents and Tibet. Washington provided sanctuary for many
fugitives from Tiananmen, who became media celebrities for a
short time, and other dissidents. Human rights and labor
activists have been able to mobilize support in Congress to
maintain pressure on the administration to try to force Beijing
to adhere to international standards of human rights and labor
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practices. As in the case of Wei Jingsheng, the "father of
Chinese democracy" who was first imprisoned by Chinese
authorities in 1979 and convicted on a separate offense in
December 1995, many Congressmen are eager to appear as defenders
of democracy in China, and the administration--any
administration--will have sympa- thy for Chinese supporters of
democracy.92
As previously noted, Beijing has strenuously rejected direct
confrontation on these issues in the strongest terms publicly,
although it has shown clemency to individual dissidents to
appease international, and especially U.S., criticism. In 1994,
after frequent discordant meetings with Beijing officials, the
Clinton administration determined that confrontation was
counterproductive as far as MFN was concerned, and de-linked that
issue from human rights. Human rights issues have not been
allowed to forestall U.S.-China trade discussions. China's MFN
status requires congressional action each year, however, and
members of Congress may maintain the linkage if they so choose.93
There are fundamental ideological differences between
Washington and Beijing on human rights and the degree to which
international scrutiny of domestic practices are protected by the
doctrine of sovereignty, differences which are likely to persist
even with political changes in either capital. It is likely,
therefore, that the human rights issue will be a restraint on,
although not necessarily a complete barrier to, U.S.-PRC
cooperation in many fields.
The Taiwan issue, discussed in some detail in the earlier
section on China's foreign policy,94 also remains a difficult
issue in U.S.-China relations. Because of a historic relationship
which goes back to World War II, widespread support of democratic
developments in Taiwan, long-standing business relationships, and
the requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act,95 no U.S.
administration will abandon the people and government of Taiwan.
On the other hand, Washington will also want to maintain
relations with the world's largest nation with a large and
growing market. It is likely that the question of the status of
Taiwan will only be resolved between Taipei and Beijing, without
much direct U.S. participation. In the meantime, like the
question of human rights, Washington will need to manage the
disagreements on the issue without seriously under- mining
progress on other aspects of U.S.-China relations.
Japan. "There is no more important bilateral relationship
than the one we have with Japan, according to United States
Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region.96 Moreover, in
the words of the same authoritative document, "our security
alliance with Japan is the linchpin of United States policy in
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Asia."97
The justification for such sweeping statements is wellknown, and accepted even by those who do not support U.S. policy.
Japan's economy is the second largest in the world, and it is
highly interdependent with the economy of the United States. Many
Japanese companies operate subsidiaries in the United States, and
while relatively few U.S. companies have been successful
penetrating Japan's market, U.S. private foreign investment in
Japan is high. It is normal for U.S. products to contain
components manufactured in Japan (and other countries also), and
vice-versa.
U.S.-Japanese trade was the second largest bilateral trade
relationship in the world in 1994, exceeded only by U.S.-Canada
trade.98 The United States bought more from Japan than from any
nation except Canada, and sold more to Japan than to any nation
except Canada. While the U.S. trade deficit with Japan approached
$70 billion (39.2 percent of total bilateral trade) in 1994-clearly an unsustainable relationship--U.S. exports to Japan
nonetheless represented some 2.2 million American jobs.99
Moreover, Japan's surplus has been declining.
In the security arena, Washington views its alliance with
Japan as one of the most critical factors in East Asian
stability. This is partly because Japan is the host for 47,000
U.S. military personnel who might not be stationed in the region
without the U.S.-Japan alliance. It is also partly because
Japan's geo-strategic position provides the United States with a
valuable logistics and staging base in the case of conflict in
Korea or elsewhere in Northeast Asia.
The U.S.-Japan security relationship is perhaps most
important because it "binds Japan to a framework which enhances
the security of its neighbors."100 The alliance gives a degree of
predictability to Japanese behavior, which allows these countries
to interact with Japan with confidence, its history in the 1930s
and 1940s notwithstanding. Without the alliance and the U.S. role
in Japan's security, to again use the words of the editors of The
Straits Times of Singapore, "Tokyo will be forced to fend for
itself militarily, fueling an expensive and dangerous arms race
in the region."101 As the alliance limits Japan's freedom of
action so that it is accepted in East Asia, it also provides a
rationale and structure for Washington to merge its capabilities
and influence with Japan to balance or restrain the emerging
power of China.
Despite the importance to the United States of relations
with Japan, Washington's recent actions seem not to have focused
on cooperation with Tokyo, but on demands that Tokyo buy more
foreign--especially American--commodities. U.S. Trade
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Representatives have bargained endlessly with their Japanese
counterparts, frequently threatening retaliatory actions if Tokyo
ignores U.S. demands. The Clinton administration has not only
sought the removal of barriers to imports, many of which are
alleged to be implicit in Japanese business practices rather than
the legal structure, although that continues to be a U.S. goal.
The new priority is for agreements which are results oriented;
i.e., which require that Japan purchase specific quantities of
U.S. products, initially automobile parts. Tokyo, which once
promoted an industrial policy which helped Japanese business
dominate many sectors of international trade, now ironically
argues on the basis of the principles of free trade to oppose
U.S. proposals. And Washington, usually the major defender of
unfettered trade, now seems to advocate management of the market
to reduce its staggering trade deficit with Japan. In Washington
(and in Tokyo), political leaders have proclaimed public
positions which seem as much directed to domestic constituencies
as to the Japanese government, often in undiplomatic, shrill
language. Not surprisingly, this approach has not led to a
mutually satisfactory formula, although crises have been avoided
through ambiguous compromises which each side can interpret as a
victory.
The ultimate resolution of the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance
will probably require domestic changes in each country rather
than foreign policy maneuvers.102 At the least, Washington must
adopt policies which encourage national savings, so that the
nation no longer consumes more than it produces, and Tokyo must
facilitate more consumption by, among other things, freeing its
domestic economy from overregulation.
In political and security affairs, U.S.-Japanese cooperation
is more harmonious. Washington consults closely and frequently
with Tokyo, and the latter usually supports the former's
initiative. There is a formal structure for security consultation
which ranges from Minister of Foreign Affairs/Secretary of State
and Defense Agency Director General/Secretary of Defense to U.S.
Forces Japan and agency officials in Tokyo. High-level exchanges
are supplemented by educational and functional exchanges. There
is a busy schedule of combined exercises which involve JSDF and
U.S. armed forces which takes place in Japan or in the waters and
sky close to Japan.103 Except for a combined military headquarters
and integrated command structure, the relations between the U.S.
military and the JSDF are as close and multifaceted as those
between the United States and any other ally. In response to U.S.
requests, Tokyo provides the most generous burden-sharing support
of all U.S. allies.104
This is not to say that there are no disagreements over
political and security questions between the two capitals. Japan,
more highly dependent on Persian Gulf petroleum than is the
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United States, has frequently demurred from Washington's
positions on the Middle East. Washington and Tokyo have not
always seen eye-to-eye with respect to China, Russia, Korea, or
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), among other
issues. Tokyo's response to international crises, most notably in
the Persian Gulf War, have often not met U.S. expectations.
Generally, however, both governments have attempted to downplay
differences and search for accommodations.
Together with Tokyo, Washington has tried to isolate the
trade conflict from U.S.-Japan security cooperation. That policy
was reasonably successful in the past, but may become
increasingly difficult, in Washington as in Tokyo, when the trade
issue surfaces as an item of domestic politics. Unemployment in
the manufacturing sector in the United States regularly
stimulates "Japan bashing" and disturbingly high ratios of
Americans indicate negative views of Japan and the MST.105 In the
absence of the common clear and present danger presumed to have
existed during the Cold War, critics of U.S. policy toward Japan,
from libertarian isolationists to revisionists, have found more
receptive audiences than in the past. The more sophisticated
critiques argue that the U.S.-Japan security alliance, especially
U.S. armed forces stationed in Japan, has outlived its
usefulness.106 They maintain that Japan has the resources and
maturity to provide for its own security and the stability of the
region, that continued U.S. tutelage is unnecessary and
counterproductive, and that Japan need not threaten its
neighbors.
CONCLUSIONS
The U.S.-Japan Relationship.
All of the bilateral relationships of the Northeast Asian
strategic triangle probably will remain in flux during the
remainder of the 1990s and the first years of the 21st century.
The U.S.-Japan tie will probably be the most stable, even though
disputes over trade may frequently place the alliance under
strain. But, aside from economic competition, U.S. and Japanese
national interests tend to be compatible. Differences over trade
issues, as large and significant as they may be, are not as
fundamental as the underlying agreement on the international
trading system which has supported the prosperity of both
nations. Moreover, both Washington and Tokyo benefit from a
stable regional environment, and both would feel threatened by
the emergence of a hegemon on the Asian continent. Under current
and foreseeable conditions in Northeast Asia, Tokyo is likely to
support Washington's policy of forward presence and engagement in
the region. And while there are significant differences in the
political cultures of Japan and the United States, the commitment
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of both to market economies, democracy, and human rights provides
an ideological foundation for the alliance.
The U.S.-Japan relationship is also the most highly
institutionalized of the strategic triangle. Washington and Tokyo
are partners in an alliance formed over 40 years ago with formal
and informal structures for decisionmaking, and tested patterns
of cooperation. In both private and public sectors there are
networks linking Japanese and Americans with similar interests
and concerns. The centrifugal forces in U.S.-Japanese relations,
which may be strong and involve stakes of great importance, will
be resisted by mature organizations and inertia grounded in years
of experience. These considerations should cause leaders in both
nations to defend the alliance to their respective
constituencies.
The unforeseeable conditions which would most likely
undermine the strong foundations of the alliance would involve
significant domestic political developments in one or both
nations. It is well beyond the scope of this analysis to
speculate on the future of Japanese or American politics, but it
is probable that the victory in Washington of isolationists who
would disengage from international responsibilities or the
emergence of nationalists with an agenda of international
aggrandizement in Tokyo would require a different U.S.-Japanese
relationship. It is also likely that the strongest stimulus for
the success of assertive nationalists in Japan would be the
perception of impending U.S. disengagement, which would create
widespread fears among Japanese for their security. Even a
government of moderates would have to review defense policy
should the United States disengage from Northeast Asia. Japanese
defense policy is anchored in the belief that the United States
will act as its protector. When that belief can no longer be
sustained, new defense policies likely to cause destabilizing
reactions from other governments in the region are almost
inevitable.
The China-Japan Relationship.
The China-Japan relationship, the second most stable of the
three, is potentially quite volatile. Tokyo and Beijing currently
share objectives with respect to trade and investment, on the one
hand, and regional--particularly Korean--stability, on the other
hand. This should support viable bilateral ties in the short
range.
For the long term, however, their interests appear to
diverge with respect to some important issues. For example, the
Chinese and Japanese versions of the architecture of a stable
Northeast Asia are not necessarily compatible, particularly with
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respect to the status of Taiwan and the role of the United
States. Despite public statements to the contrary, both Beijing
and Tokyo may prefer the status quo in Korea over a single,
strong Korean state, but each would energetically oppose an
arrangement which benefited--or appeared to benefit--the other on
this peninsula which historically has been the venue of SinoJapanese competition. Moreover, neither government is likely to
acquiesce in the domination of Northeast Asia, or Southeast Asia,
by the other. And elites of each nation are basically suspicious
of the other.
The mutual benefits of trade and investment which both
nations now enjoy, and are apparently increasing dramatically,
could sustain the bilateral relationship for an extended period
of time, despite serious political disagreements. However, the
quality of economic interactions between China and Japan is
different from those between the United States and Japan, and do
not form the same complex pattern of interdependency which makes
each economy highly dependent on the other and therefore provides
a structure for long-term comprehensive cooperation. In spite of
the remarkable economic growth which has occurred in China, the
two nations stand at different levels of economic development.
Japan is a prototype of a post-industrial, information-age
economy; China is still a developing economy depending on others
for sophisticated technology, with many sectors and areas in a
pre-industrial environment. As China's economy matures, so will
the foundation for more integrative interdepen- dencies. But this
is not likely to occur for decades, if ever.
The China-Japan relationship also obviously lacks an
ideological basis. Many aspects of the cultures of China and
Japan have common roots, but the dominant political attitudes and
values of the two societies have little in common.
As in the U.S.-Japan relationship, China-Japan relations
will be influenced by domestic political developments in each
country. While politics in both China and Japan is in transition,
the former's political system depends more on personal linkages
and is less stable than the latter's. Moreover, political change
in Japan is less likely to have a direct impact on foreign policy
as in China, where the ascendancy of assertive nationalists with
a low priority on reform could be immediately destabilizing in
the region.
The U.S.-China Relationship.
The
strategic
presently
the other

last bilateral relationship of the Northeast Asian
triangle--that between the United States and China--is
weak, and potentially more fragile and unstable than
two. Each government has good reasons to maintain
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comprehensive relations which include trade and investment and
dialogues on a wide range of political and security issues. These
have been sufficient to motivate Beijing and Washington to
advance from the very low point of their relationship after
President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan visited Cornell University. But
the Clinton administration and Jiang Zemin's regime have both
come under attack at home for the accommodations they arranged,
and neither is in a strong position to make additional
concessions, even if it wanted to. There is less ideological
compatibility, and probably less interdepen- dence, between China
and the United States than between China and Japan.
If there is a further devolution of power from Beijing to
local authorities, problems in U.S.-China relations may
deteriorate further. When local governments and enterprises do
not execute policy made in Beijing, which is apparently now the
case with respect to intellectual property agreements, bilateral
economic activities suffer. Moreover, except for prison
factories, the greatest alleged abuses of international labor
standards in China are probably committed by private
entrepreneurs and managers at the local level, not by state
enterprises.
It is likely that the fundamental differences between the
two governments will persist for some time. The chances of a
government in Washington which is more likely than the present
one to ignore the human rights situation in China, minimize the
U.S. security commitment to Taiwan, and allow unfair trading
practices by Beijing are extremely slim. And, at least in the
short range, it is even less likely that those governing China
will accept Western conceptions of human rights or what they
consider U.S. interference in China's domestic concerns,
particularly with respect to Taiwan and political freedoms.
Indeed, should the current succession struggle in Beijing result
in victory for assertive nationalists and/or opponents of
continued rapid economic reform, China's policy toward the United
States may become significantly more confrontational. If that
were the case, even the economic aspects of U.S.-China relations
would be difficult to sustain at present levels.
Regional Judgments.
There are at least four general conclusions which cut across
all bilateral relationships which are particularly salient for
the United States:
First, for the foreseeable future U.S. engagement in
Northeast Asia is likely to be one of the necessary conditions
for regional stability, which in turn is one of the necessary
conditions for expanding international trade and investment
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opportunities. Execution of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and
easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula, acceptance of a more
active regional and international role by Japan, avoidance of
conflict over Taiwan, and inclusion of China into international
regimes which will restrain its behavior--all depend upon active
participation by the United States.
Second, the absence of a grand unifying concept for U.S.
foreign policy--a functional equivalent of containment during the
Cold War--makes it difficult for Washington to establish
priorities among foreign policy objectives, and difficult for
other governments to understand U.S. actions. It is much less
likely that Chinese officials and analysts could perceive a U.S.
strategy of containment or South Korean observers imagine that
Washington favored Pyongyang over Seoul, if U.S. policy could be
articulated on the basis of a grand conceptual scheme. One not
only does not exist, however, but none has been offered by
critics.
Third, Washington's high priority on economics, especially
export promotion, further complicates the execution of foreign
policy. The economic emphasis places prominence on segments of
the bureaucracy, and personnel with backgrounds and skills, which
differ from the traditional diplomat representing foreign affairs
and defense agencies. In the field, personnel of the Office of
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) seem to employ harsher rhetoric
and a more confrontational style than their counterparts from
State and Defense. In Washington, the inclusion of USTR, Commerce
and Treasury in the machinery of foreign policy coordination
complicates an already imperfect mechanism.
Fourth, the United States may be the only remaining
superpower, but without the discipline provided by a competing
superpower, it cannot expect automatic loyalty from allies and
acceptance of even high priority initiatives. In the contemporary
international system, unequal alliances and relationships which
were characteristic of the Cold War rarely can be maintained or
established. Certainly in Northeast Asia that is the case.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Since both of the other members of the Northeast Asian
strategic triangle place their highest priority on relations with
the United States, U.S. policy and behavior necessarily have
great impact in the region. Sharp reversals of policy would be
especially destabilizing, and threaten the conditions which
Washington, through many adminis- trations, has said it wanted to
preserve.
Abrupt U.S. Policy Changes Destabilizing.
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While on specific questions Washington can introduce changes
which could be useful, in the short range the fundamental factors
of U.S. policy should remain constant. That is, the United States
should retain its alliances with Japan and South Korea, maintain
approximately the same military presence in the region, and
remain engaged in the affairs of Northeast Asia. It is
particularly important that the United States pursue
comprehensive engagement with China, and resolutely enforce the
Agreed Framework with the DPRK. These U.S. policies may not be
sufficient to insure regional stability, but they are necessary
conditions without which stability is highly unlikely.

Need for Better Interagency Cooperation. The U.S.
government could improve the execution of its policy in Northeast
Asia in at least two ways. First, it could perfect or develop
smoother coordination machinery among agencies operating in the
region. Given the nature of the U.S. system, some inconsistencies
may be unavoidable, but they could be reduced to a more
acceptable level. Together with relevant civilian agencies, the
Department of Defense, the separate services, and military
headquarters in the region should all be involved in the
coordination process.
Benefits of Regional Specialists. A second way to improve
execution of policy is to recruit and develop a cadre of
personnel with regional expertise, and provide incentives for
those personnel to remain in government. The greatest need for
regional specialists may be in those agencies which traditionally
have not been engaged in foreign affairs, such as Commerce,
Treasury, and USTR. But there is an apparent deficit or
underutilization of specialists within the State Department and
Department of Defense. Moreover, neither of these traditional
foreign affairs agencies seems to reward regional expertise.
Within the State Department, personnel are consciously moved from
region to region and function to function, emphasizing breath
over depth in career development. In the military services, those
skilled in combat operations receive preference for promotion and
senior educational opportunities over regional experts, Northeast
Asian or otherwise. This is even true in the U.S. Army, which
still maintains its effective Foreign Area Officer program but
fails to provide adequate opportunities for advancement within
it.
Within the existing environment, U.S. disengagement, or
actions which lead to a widespread perception that disengagement
is imminent, would lead to an unacceptable level of instability.
Unfortunately, Northeast Asian leaders tend to be extremely
suspicious of Washington's behavior in this regard. Seoul's
reaction to U.S. approaches to North Korea over the Agreed
Framework and Tokyo's peeve over President Clinton's decision not
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to attend the APEC Summit in 1995 illustrate this tendency.
Long-Range Adjustments in U.S. Policy.
While the analysis supports official U.S. policy as outlined
in United States Security Strategy for the East Asian-Pacific
Region for the short range, it implies that the United States
should adopt some new approaches for the long range. Short range,
in this analysis, refers to the period of time, whether few or
many years, when the fundamental characteristics of international
politics within Northeast Asia and within the three bilateral
relationships of the strategic triangle remain more-or-less
unchanged. Long range implies that important variables have
changed, so much so that it is possible to say that a new system
of interaction has emerged. It is uncertain what that system's
characteristics will be, but very likely they will include
greater complexity and a further decline in the occasions when
military force is the optimum instrument of influence.
Such a transformation could come about, probably gradually
but perhaps abruptly, because of a change in the number of
players (North-South Korean or China-Taiwan unification, return
to an active role by Russia) or significant domestic political
changes within one or all of the major powers. External events
might also lead to systemic transformation. In any case, such
changes are possible at almost any time, or, indeed, probably are
now taking place. Washington should be prepared to adapt without
abruptly changing its posture in the region.
As this author has argued in another publication,107 the
combination of bilateral security relationships, forward
presence, and engagement is adequate for the United States to
move from short- to long-range conditions if the ingredients of
U.S. security policy are supplemented by multilateral structures.
These should not only include fora for consultation, but also
organizations to foster confidence building measures and the
adjustment of regional disputes. As noted, KEDO may be considered
one of these structures. It is possible that agencies with
broader jurisdiction, such as APEC and ARF, offer a better venue
for Northeast Asian nations and the United States to explore
regional problems, precisely because other members might be
better able to mediate or provide neutral sites for discussion
than any of the relatively small number of Northeast Asian
actors. In any case, multilateral structures of the type
advocated by President Clinton but not yet established (except
for KEDO) would allow for flexibility in managing disputes. They
would also permit continued U.S. engagement with a lower profile
and perhaps lower costs.
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